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Abstract 
 
 
Despite macroeconomic evidence pointing to a negative aggregate consumption response due to 
political uncertainty, few papers have used microeconomic panel data to analyze how households 
adjust their consumption after an uncertainty shock. We study household savings and expenditure 
adjustment from an unexpected, large-scale and rapidly evolving political shock that occurred 
largely in May 1989 in Beijing, China. Using monthly micro panel data, we present evidence that a 
surge in political uncertainty resulted in significant temporary increases in savings among urban 
households in China. Households responded mainly by reducing semi-durable expenditure and 
frequency of major durable adjustment. The uncertainty effect is more pronounced among older, 
wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. We interpret our findings using existing 
models of precautionary behavior. By focusing on time variation in uncertainty, our identification 
strategy avoids many of the potential problems in empirical studies of precautionary savings such 
as self-selection and life-cycle effects.  
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1. Introduction 
Major political events, such as the US presidential election in 2000, the 9/11 terrorist attack, and 
the more recent Arab Spring, can have profound impacts on household consumption. For example, 
retail sales in the United States dropped by over 2.5% in September 2001, the month when the 
terrorist attack took place. These political shocks are often accompanied by an increase in policy 
uncertainty, where a growing literature shows that uncertainty shocks can have substantial 
economic impacts.1 
 
Despite the macroeconomic evidence pointing to a negative aggregate consumption response due 
to political uncertainty, very few papers have used microeconomic panel data to analyze how 
households adjust their consumption after an uncertainty shock. Detailed household consumption 
panel data are essential both to understand the channel through which households adjust their 
consumption and of the variation of the adjustments across different types of households. 
However, most microeconomic data of consumer expenditure are collected at low frequency and 
have a long recall period.2 Since uncertainty shocks are usually short-lived, the initial impact on 
household consumption often differs from the impact on future consumption when households 
gradually adjust to a new steady state. Without high-frequency consumption panels at household 
level, it is difficult to identify the size of the initial impact of an uncertainty shock and the path of 
dynamic adjustments afterwards.  
 
Our first contribution is to analyzing household consumption around a time of escalating political 
uncertainty, using household panel data collected at monthly frequency from China. We exploit an 
unexpected, large-scale and rapidly evolving political shock that occurred largely in May 1989 in 
Beijing, China. The event, also known as the Tianʼanmen Square Movement, was triggered by the 
unexpected death of a former leader in mid-April 1989, culminated in May, and faded after the 
Chinese government took action on June 4 in the same year. The event resulted in a change in 
political leadership and is widely regarded to mark the end of a period of rapid reform in China. 
1 See Bloom (2013) for a review of this literature. Empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty shocks have 
negative effects on growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995), consumer spending (Romer 1990), and investment 
and hiring (Bloom, 2009).  
2 The Consumer Expenditure Survey, the most commonly used household consumption data in the United 
States, reports quarterly expenditure from the interview sample. The interview sample follows survey 
households for a maximum of five quarters. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics collects data on food 
consumption based on the amount spent on food in an average week. Since interviews are usually conducted 
around March each year, it has been argued that people report their food expenditure for an average week 
around that period.  
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Following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) and Bloom (2013), we present two descriptive 
measures showing increased policy uncertainty associated with the political event.  
 
Our empirical analysis is conducted using monthly micro panel data from a sample of the Urban 
Household Survey in China. The monthly expenditure is based on detailed daily diary entries 
covering all types of household expenditures. Our empirical approach is simple: we compare the 
mean household savings in April, the month immediately before the rise in political uncertainty, 
and in May of 1989, when the uncertainty shock took place. Differences in savings between these 
months could still be due to seasonality of consumption and/or income. For the comparison group, 
we use data from April and May of 1990 to estimate the difference in outcomes and subtract it 
from the estimate of the effect obtained from the 1989 data (a difference-in-difference estimator). 
One main advantage of using household panel data is that we are able to document the 
heterogeneity in the effects of uncertainty shock for different types of households and for different 
types of consumer expenditure. The micro data also allows us to control for household composition 
and demographic changes that may contaminate our results. 
 
After adjusting for seasonality, we find that the saving rate increased by 18 percentage points in the 
month when the uncertainty shock culminated. The increase in savings was larger for households 
that had older heads, that were wealthier prior to the shock, and that were more socially 
advantaged. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of household characteristics and to using 
household balance sheets as an alternative definition of savings. We are able to rule out any shocks 
to household resources from the political uncertainty, as there is no evidence of changes in average 
household income or wealth.  We also do not find any significant change in idiosyncratic income 
uncertainty identified from realized income streams--neither the variance of permanent shocks nor 
the variance of transitory shocks change before and after the shock that took place in May 1989. 
Interestingly, the increase in savings is entirely due to a sizable reduction in semi-durable 
consumption (i.e. clothing and footwear) and frequency of major durable adjustment. Non-durable 
consumption is not affected by the uncertainty shock.  Our estimates survive a range of robustness 
and placebo tests. To the extent that pessimism is concerned with longer term prospects than those 
arising from short-term uncertainties, the estimated short-run effects are more likely due to 
changes in political uncertainty rather than pessimism per se. 
 
We interpret our findings using existing models of precautionary behavior. Unlike many other 
uncertainty shocks (such as the Great Recession) which may also affect the balance sheet of 
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households either directly (through a wealth or income shock) or indirectly (through a credit 
crunch), we show that the uncertainty shock we study has no direct or indirect impact on household 
balance sheets. Although our empirical specification is limited in further distinguishing between 
alternative channels that are associated with the political event (such as pessimism or disruption in 
daily activity), our estimates suggest that uncertainty is the most plausible channel driving our 
results (see Section 5.5 for a discussion). Our estimates on household savings therefore shed new 
light on the strength of the precautionary saving motive, where empirical estimates using 
microeconomic data have not yet converged.3 Existing empirical tests on precautionary savings 
behavior almost all rely on cross-section differences in risk within the sample. The key identifying 
assumption is that the measure of risk must be exogenous; that is, it has to be uncorrelated with any 
other unobservables that might also determine consumer behavior.4 However, cross-sectional 
differences in risks may be correlated with unobservable (and likely heterogeneous) characteristics 
of the household, such as risk aversion and prudence, which would affect consumption choices 
directly. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) show that correcting for self-selection into 
occupations decreases precautionary savings significantly. In addition, income risk may be 
correlated with life-cycle profiles of income and expected mean levels of income (Browning, 
Ejrnæs and Alvarez 2010). This means that the estimated correlation between risk and savings that 
is coined as the precautionary motive may be contaminated by the life-cycle motive of savings. 
Unlike previous papers that focused on cross-sectional variation in risk, our identification strategy 
exploits unanticipated time-variation in uncertainty, which is free from the potential biases caused 
by either self-selection or life-cycle motives.5 Our estimates point to strong evidence of 
precautionary savings that is consistent with a buffer-stock model of consumer behavior (Carroll 
1997). 
 
3 Existing estimates range from close to zero precautionary savings (e.g. Skinner 1988, Guiso, Jappelli, and 
Terlizzese 1992, Dynan 1993) to significant precautionary savings accounting for substantial fraction of 
wealth accumulation (e.g. Carroll and Samwick, 1997, 1998, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005). 
Browning and Lusardi (1996) contain an excellent review of this literature.  
4 The usual empirical test is to correlate consumption or savings with some measure of risk. Researchers 
have used cross-sectional variations either in realized income risk across occupations (Skinner 1988, Carroll 
and Samwick, 1997, 1998) or geographic regions (Carroll, Dynan and Krane, 2003) or in subjective risk 
expectations (Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992 and Lusardi 1997). 
5 Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) is the only recent paper we know of to study the effect of policy 
uncertainty on households’ savings and labor supply responses. Using micro data from Germany, they 
explore the closely contested German general election during which there was uncertainty over 
unemployment and pension rules. The political uncertainty we study is likely to be more severe or 
extensive. In addition, our monthly household expenditure survey with detailed expenditure diaries allows 
us to study the channel through which total consumption is adjusted following uncertainty shock. 
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Our findings on the mechanism of expenditure adjustment are also in line with a small set of 
empirical studies of the effects of microeconomic uncertainty on adjustment decision of durable 
goods. Foote, Hurst and Leahy (2000) find that the frequency of adjustment in the CEX is 
negatively related to the imputed variance of household income obtained from regressions 
estimated with PSID data, a proxy that may be contaminated by measurement error in income and 
by prediction errors due to the small information set available to the econometrician. Using 
subjective income uncertainty measures as instruments for consumption volatility, Bertola, Guiso 
and Pistaferri (2005) find that uncertainty leads to smaller adjustments of consumer durables at the 
extensive margin.6  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical predictions of a buffer-stock 
model in light of rising uncertainty. Section 3 describes the political events leading to the 
uncertainty shock and presents descriptive measures of uncertainty during the period. Section 4 
describes the data and the sample in use, followed by our main empirical model and results 
presented in section 5. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical models of buffer-stock saving predict that household consumption would drop when 
faced with an uncertainty shock (e.g. Zeldes 1989, Caballero 1990, Kimball 1990, Carroll 1997).7 
In an infinite-horizon buffer-stock saving model, Carroll (1992) shows the dynamic adjustment to 
a permanent increase in unemployment risk taking place between years t and t+1. Suppose that, 
prior to year t, the consumer was at equilibrium levels of consumption, net wealth, and saving 
ratios. In year t+1, the first year under the higher unemployment risk regime, the buffer-stock 
model implies that consumption drops sharply and the saving rate rises. Net wealth therefore 
begins to increase. After the initial adjustment, consumption slowly increases and the saving rate 
steadily declines toward their long-run steady states. In the new steady state, the consumption ratio 
is slightly lower than before the shock, while the saving rate and the net wealth ratio are both 
6 Also see Parker (1999) and Browning and Crossley (2009) on how households adjust durable and non-
durable spending when faced with income shocks.  
7 Models of precautionary savings have focused on one specific type of uncertainty, namely labor income 
uncertainty. In our context, the political shock may also drive up uncertainty about returns on financial 
assets. Bank savings accounts are the only type of financial asset consumers invest in. With only one 
available financial asset, the implication of a rate of return uncertainty is the same as that of an increase in 
labor income uncertainty (Merton 1969 and Samuelson 1969).  
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higher.8  
 
The differences between initial adjustment of consumption and savings and future adjustment 
paths highlight the need for a high-frequency consumption panel in order to identify the extent of 
the precautionary saving motive. In the steady state of a buffer-stock saving model, average 
consumption will approximately equal average income regardless of the level of uncertainty that 
the consumers face (Carroll and Samwick 1997). If consumption data are collected at low 
frequency and consumers have already adjusted to the new steady state with the optimal amount of 
buffer-stock savings, there will be no apparent relation between current consumption or the current 
saving rate and the uncertainty of income. However, until the optimal buffer stock is achieved, 
there will be a relation between consumption and uncertainty: the consumer facing higher 
uncertainty will initially have to depress consumption more in order to build up a larger stock of 
wealth.  
 
3. The Political Uncertainty Shock 
Chinaʼs economic reforms started in 1978, after Deng Xiaoping came to power. The de-
collectivization of the agricultural sector was a huge success, leading to a 6.6 percent annual 
growth of the sector during the period 1979‒1985. However, the reform in urban China starting in 
1984 was characterized by cycles of overheating and austerity. Figure 1 shows the annual real 
GDP growth rate. The Chinese economy has gone through three cycles, with peaks in 1985, 1988 
and 1992. Each cycle began with periods of rapid growth, accompanied by accelerating inflation, 
and followed by prolonged contractions during which the growth rate and inflation declined in 
tandem (see for example Fan et.al 1996, Brandt and Zhu 2000).  
 
Despite facing an urban inflation rate of 9.1% for 1987 as a whole, the central government 
announced plans for a comprehensive price reform in June 1988. The justification given for such a 
price reform was that “long pain is no better than short pain” and that market prices should be put 
in place at once (Zhao 1999). The price reform immediately resulted in unprecedented pressure on 
inflation and in panic buying, as documented in Aaberge and Zhu (2001). The government had to 
make a policy U-turn within three months to stabilize the economy, thus leading to increased 
8 See Figure 6 in Carroll (1992). For implications of uncertainty of consumption over the life cycle, see 
Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Chamon, Liu and Prasad (2013) show that a sharp increase in income 
uncertainty in late 1990s, largely due to an increase in the variance in household income attributed to 
transitory idiosyncratic shocks, could account for two-thirds of the increase in China's urban household 
saving rate in the same period.  
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unemployment and public discontent. Zhao Ziyang, who oversaw the urban reform as the Premier 
until becoming Secretary General of the Communist Party in November 1987 (acting since January 
1987 following Hu Yaobangʼs resignation), was blamed for the mismanagement of the price 
reform and was forced to grant economic authority to the central planners (see Ji (1991)).  
 
The Tianʼanmen Movement is widely regarded to mark the end of a period of rapid reform in 
China. From then until Dengʼs visit to southern China in 1992, policies shifted back to the views 
that had prevailed ten years before: central planning should be the focus, and the market should 
take on a subordinate role. Next, we first describe the development of the Tianʼanmen Movement 
in detail and then provide empirical evidence of a significant increase in policy uncertainty during 
the period of the Movement.  
 
3.1. The timeline of the Tianʼanmen Square Movement 
The Tianʼanmen Square Movement began in 1989 as a spontaneous expression of public mourning 
for Hu Yaobang, the former Secretary General who had died from a heart attack. However, it 
quickly evolved into nationwide protests supporting political reform and demanding an end to 
corruption in the Communist Party. The timeline of the developments is as follows:9 
• April 15, 1989 (the trigger): The sudden death of Hu Yaobang, who suffered from a heart 
attack a week earlier during a politburo meeting. Hu was forced to resign as the Chinese 
Communist Partyʼs Secretary General in January 1987 for being too lenient with the 
widespread student protests that occurred at the end of 1986. 
• April 18‒22: Students gathered in Tianʼanmen Square to mourn Huʼs death prior to and during 
Huʼs memorial service on April 22 in the Great Hall of the People, calling for more freedom 
and democracy. However, their petition of demands and request for a meeting with Li Peng, 
the Premier, were rejected. 
• April 26: (the turning point): The Peopleʼs Dailyʼs front-page editorial defined the student 
movement as an anti-party revolt that had to be resolutely opposed. The editorial enraged the 
student protesters, who fought for it to be retracted.  
• April 27–May 19: The student protests escalated, and a hunger strike began on May 13, ahead 
of the historical visit by Mikhail Gorbachev for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years. The 
General Secretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, ordered the state news media to cover 
9 Main source: BBC (the timeline): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8057148.stm 
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the student demonstrations with unprecedented openness and made several attempts to open up 
channels for direct dialog between the students and the government.  
• May 20–June 2: Martial law was declared in several districts in Beijing on May 20 after Zhao 
Ziyang, who was accused of sympathizing with the students, was sidelined by hardliners. 
However, the troops’ advancement towards the city center was blocked by over a million 
workers and citizens.  
• June 3–4: Troops were ordered to put down the “counter-revolutionary riot” by force. Live 
ammunition was fired as the army tried to break through the barricades, with estimates of 
civilian casualties ranging from hundreds to thousands. Beijing was under the full control of 
the army by June 4.  
• June 5–9: Protests continued in other cities in mainland China, including Chengdu, the 
provincial capital of Sichuan, for several days. However, on June 9, the first public appearance 
and speech in months by Deng Xiaoping, Chinaʼs de facto leader, signaled the restoration of 
order and full control over the situation. Martial law in certain areas of Beijing was not lifted 
until January 10, 1990.  
 
The movement in Beijing also spread to other cities throughout China. In Sichuan province where 
our household sample was collected, pro-democracy demonstrators had been camping out 
peacefully in Chengdu (the capital of Sichuan province) for several weeks in a scaled-down 
version of the Tianʼanmen protest (Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1989). 10 The security forces in 
Chengdu undertook two major actions against the demonstrators, one on the night of Sunday 4 
June, the other on the following night of Monday 5 June (The New York Times, June 23, 1989).  
 
3.2. Evidence of uncertainty shock 
We provide two descriptive measures of the evolution of uncertainty during this period, following 
the work of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012). We should emphasize that neither piece of evidence 
maps directly into a single type of uncertainty which would affect consumption and saving 
decisions in a standard model (such as uncertainty in future labor income).  Therefore, from these 
descriptive measures it is hard to make quantitative statements about the contribution of 
precautionary saving. Nevertheless, they are useful benchmark evidence for the existence of any 
uncertainty shock.  
10 Sichuan is a mountainous province situated in the south-west of China. The provincial capital, Chengdu, 
is approximately 1,505 kilometers (935 miles) from Beijing.  
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Our first measure is the media mention of the word “uncertainty“. We count the frequency of 
articles containing the words “China“ and “uncertainty“ or “uncertain” from three major news 
sources in Western media, The New York Times, The Financial Times, and The Economist, 
between February 1 and September 1, 1989. Figure 2 shows the frequency of newspaper articles by 
month. There is a dramatic increase in the number of articles relating to uncertainty in China from 
the beginning of May until early June, corresponding to the period of rapid development of the 
Movement. Thereafter, the numbers decrease and, by August of the same year, return to the same 
level as in early 1989.  
 
Our second measure is that of stock market volatility around that time. China did not have a stock 
market in 1989, so we turn to the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong (a colonial territory of the UK at 
that time), which is closely connected to China.11 Figure 3 shows the daily Hang Seng Index from 
the beginning of April until the end of June. There were large fluctuations in May and the 
beginning of June 1989. Each fluctuation corresponds to good or bad news related to Tianʼanmen 
Square. The declaration of martial law resulted in large losses in the index, whereas stock markets 
reacted positively a day later to a halt in the military crackdown by over a million workers in 
Beijing. The largest drop took place on June 5, the first Monday following the crackdown, when 
the Index dropped by more than 20%. The public speech given by de facto leader Deng Xiaoping 
on June 9, which sent a strong signal of restoration of order and full control of the Communist 
Party, put an end to a period of strong volatility in the market.  The large and frequent fluctuation 
of the Hang Seng Index led to significant increase in stock market volatility during the period of 
the Movement. The standard deviation of daily closing prices from May 1 to June 12 (including the 
first trading day after Dengʼs speech) was 382, i.e. six times greater than the standard deviation of 
daily closing prices in April and in the rest of June (at 53.95 and 54.02, respectively). 
 
4. The Data 
The data used in this paper is a four-year rotational monthly panel of 270 urban households in 
Sichuan province for the time period 1988‒1991. The data was collected by the Statistical Bureau 
in Sichuan province as part of sample contributing to the national Urban Household Survey of 
11 The preferred measure of volatility is the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 days based on 
option prices, since political uncertainty is priced in the options market in ways predicted by the theory 
(Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi 2014). However, option trading in Hong Kong did not start until 1995 (Hong 
Kong Securities Market 1999).  
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China (UHS) (administered by the Statistical Bureau of China).  To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the only monthly panel of UHS that has ever been made available to researchers (Aaberge and 
Zhu, 2001). Typically researchers working with UHS have to rely on the annual samples covering 
a certain number of provinces. 
 
The sampling of the households follow a rotational design: one third of the households were 
changed in each year. Due to the rotational design of the panel, each household is observed for 12, 
24 or 36 months. Unlike most expenditure surveys conducted in developed countries, this approach 
of monthly reporting of all expenditure from diaries yields high-frequency consumption and 
income series measured with high precision. 12 Each household earner was required to keep a diary 
of his/her cash income and non-consumptive expenditure. One diary for the whole household was 
required for consumptive expenditure. These diaries were collected regularly by enumerators for 
monthly aggregation.13 Each enumerator must visit each of the 20 households under his/her 
supervision at least twice a month.  
 
4.1. Definitions of income, consumption, and saving 
Total household income can be decomposed into labor income, property income, transfer income, 
and special income,14 accounting for 69.3%, 0.5%, 26.1%, and 4.1% of the total respectively in our 
pooled sample. Almost 80% of property income can be accounted for by interest income, with the 
rest coming from dividends and rents. This implies that the most important saving vehicle is 
savings accounts, consistent with under-development of the credit market in China at the time.15 
There is no evidence of any significant change in the composition of real total household income 
over the sample period.  
 
We disaggregate total household expenditure into three categories by durability of expenditures. 
Our empirical analysis is performed on each category of expenditure, as well as total household 
12 For instance, the Consumer Expenditure Survey for the United States and the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES) for the UK collect detailed household expenditure information based on two consecutive weekly 
diary records, supplemented with information about regular payments.  
13 When the respondent suffers from poor literacy or in the case of households with a single person who is 
elderly, sick or disabled, the enumerator is responsible for the diary records. 
14 Labor income includes base wage, floating wage, contract income, bonuses and subsidies, and other wage 
income from state or collectively owned units, income from self-employment, as well as income from re-
employment by retired persons. Property income includes interest, dividends, and rents. Transfer income 
includes income from dependents, retirement income, price subsidies, and other transfer income. Special 
income refers to income from gifts, lodgers, survey subsidies, and property sales.  
15 China’s first stock exchange only began trading in December 1990. 
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consumption. Non-durable consumption is defined as expenditure on food, medicine and medical 
supplies, housing and building repairs, health and medical services, and education (school fees). 
Semi-durables include clothing and footwear. Major durables comprise furniture, mechanical and 
electric goods for cultural and recreational activities, and mechanical and electric goods for daily 
use. Note that, in the period we study, the housing market was not developed and the majority of 
the urban households lived in rental housing that was publicly subsidized.  
 
We define savings as the difference between monthly real total income and monthly real total 
consumptive expenditure at household level. Following Chamon and Prasad (2010), we do not 
deduct non-consumptive expenditure (loan interest, personal income tax and other taxes, 
maintenance/alimony, insurance cover, etc.) from savings. Furthermore, we use an alternative 
measure of savings based on the householdʼs balance sheet. This alternative measure, which is 
labeled “changes in financial wealth”, is defined as the net changes from the beginning to the end 
of the month in the stock of financial asset holdings and spot cash. In the absence of non-
consumptive expenditure and errors in diary recordings, these two measures should be identical.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of monthly household income, household consumptive 
expenditure, household size, and saving rate, by year. All monetary figures have been converted 
into January 1988 constant prices, using monthly CPI series.16 The average household income is 
328 yuan per month, with 71% coming from labor income. The mean monthly household 
consumptive expenditure is 296 yuan, 73% of which was spent on non-durables, 14% on semi-
durables (that is, clothing and footwear) and 13% on major durables. By definition, the purchase of 
major durables is infrequent, with only 13.5% of households making positive purchases in any 
given month. 
 
The mean real total household income in 1988 was only marginally higher than the mean real total 
consumptive expenditure, thus resulting in a saving rate of only 2.9%. This can largely be 
explained by consumersʼ switching from financial savings to purchases of durables after the 
outbreak of hyperinflation of around 20% p.a. in 1988 (see Aaberge and Zhu 2001).17 The saving 
16 Monthly and quarterly inflation data for China are available from OECD Statistics. However, prior to 
1993, only changes with respect to the same period in the previous year are available. We used an index at 
quarterly level from an appendix of Feltenstein and Ha (1991) to impute monthly inflation figures. This 
allowed us to convert all monetary figures into January 1988 constant prices. 
17 The real interest rate for savings in 1988 was around -10% p.a. There was state monopoly of the banking 
system at the time, with uniform interest rates set by the People’s Bank of China for each maturity term of 
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rate increased significantly to 11.3% in 1989 and to 11.1% in 1990, whereas real incomes 
remained more or less stagnant. When real income increased by 13.7% in 1991, there was a further 
increase in the saving rate, to 13.0%.18 This pattern is consistent with the aggregate urban 
household saving rates reported in Yang, Zhang and Zhou (2011), derived from the UHS data for 
six provinces and municipalities including Sichuan.  
 
Figure 4 shows monthly means of total expenditure and household income (both in real values) for 
1989 and 1990. There is clear pattern of seasonality in both income and consumption: consumption 
and income are at their highest at the beginning of the year, particularly in the month of the 
Chinese Lunar New Year, which can fall between late January and mid-February.19 For our 
purpose, it is more important to focus on trends in consumption and income in the months between 
April and May. From the top panel, it appears that the trends in real income between those months 
are similar when comparing year 1989 with year 1990. The political uncertainty in Beijing at the 
time was not an income shock to households in Sichuan province. Despite the similarity in the 
trends in income, total expenditure trends differ: consumption in May 1989 declines while 
consumption in May 1990 rises. Our empirical strategy (described below) essentially exploits this 
distinctively downward trend in total expenditure from April to May of 1989. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
The main empirical model we use is a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜋𝜋1 × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝜋𝜋2 × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖1989 + 𝜋𝜋3 × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖1989 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the outcome of interest for a given household i (such as savings), 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is a dummy 
equal to one if the calendar month is May, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
1989 is a dummy equal to one if the calendar year is 
1989, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
1989 is an interaction term between dummy variable May and dummy variable 
1989. In our baseline specification, the treatment group is year 1989, the control group is year 
deposits. Nevertheless, the People’s Bank of China was forced to change the interest rates several times in 
order to discourage substantial withdrawals of deposits. For instance, the one-year demand deposit rate was 
increased from 7.2% to 8.64% on September 1, 1988, and then again to 11.34% on February 1, 1989 as 
inflation peaked. As the inflation rate gradually decreased, it dropped to 10.08% on April 15, 1990, then to 
8.64% on August 21, 1990, and finally to 7.56% on April 21, 1991.  
18 The alternative measure of saving rate defined by household balance sheet shows a very similar trend, 
although it has a slightly lower mean. 
19 The Chinese New Year was on February 6 in 1989 and on January 27 in 1990. The timing difference 
could explain the differential changes in consumption and income (from January to February) between 1989 
and 1990. The increase in consumption between August and September can be partly explained by 
expenditure on school fees since the school year starts in September. 
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1990, and the pre- and post-treatment periods are April and May, respectively.20 The constant term 
identifies the mean level of y in the control group in the absence of treatment (April of 1990). The 
parameter 𝜋𝜋1 provides information about the seasonality in the outcome between May and April in 
the control group (which is year 1990), 𝜋𝜋2 can be interpreted as the mean level difference between 
the treated group and the control group in the absence of treatment (such as macroeconomic 
growth between the two years) and 𝜋𝜋3 captures the treatment effect. In 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, we include a set of 
household characteristics in the regression to control for any potential compositional changes 
which may be correlated with the treatment.21  
 
Under this specification, any differences in the level of outcome variable between 1989 and 1990 
are absorbed by the coefficient 𝜋𝜋2. Therefore, the model allows for any differences in the macro 
economy between 1989 and 1990 (such as GDP, real interest rate, etc.) which may affect the 
average level of y (as long as they do not affect the changes in the outcome of interest between 
April and May). Macroeconomic conditions in years 1989 and 1990 are quite similar (for example, 
real GNP growth is about 5% in both years) and we find no major policy changes that would 
influence consumption behavior between April and May in 1990. As a robustness check, we also 
experimented using both year 1990 and year 1991 as the control group to capture seasonal changes 
in the outcome of interest between April and May. The estimates are qualitatively similar (see 
discussion in the section dealing with robustness checks). 
 
In the rest of this Section, we begin by presenting the estimates from equation (1) for a range of 
outcomes including savings, income, consumption and their components.  Of particular interest is 
the estimated parameter 𝜋𝜋3, which identifies the reduced-form impacts associated with the political 
event. We interpret the results in the framework of precautionary savings. In Section 5.5, we 
provide a detailed discussion of potential alternative interpretations of the results.  
 
5.1. Main results 
Table 2 presents the DID estimates for total expenditure, total non-durable expenditure, and total 
semi-durable expenditure, controlling for key household characteristics such as household (HH) 
20 Year 1988 was the peak year in the second business cycle in the post-reform era, with hyperinflation and 
panic buying of consumer durables (see Aaberge and Zhu 2001). In addition, there was a comprehensive 
price reform implemented in June 1988. For these reasons, we did not use 1988 as the control year. 
21 Our results are robust to controlling for additional characteristics of the head such as marital status, 
occupation, industry, education and ownership of working unit.  Our findings remain unchanged even if we 
completely drop the set of household characteristics from the regression.   
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size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. In order to 
focus on the extensive margin of the major durable expenditures, we use a dummy for spending at 
least 25% of household income in any month on major durables as the dependent variable in the 
last column. Column 1 shows that the shock to political uncertainty led to a significant drop in total 
household expenditure by around 46 yuan, which is equivalent to a 17% decrease relative to the 
mean total expenditure of 273 yuan for 1989 as a whole. The effect is statistically significant at the 
10% level.  
 
In the remaining columns, we disaggregate total consumption into three categories by the 
durability of the expenditure. Column 2 shows that there is no evidence of a treatment effect on 
non-durables. Columns 3 and 4 present the effect of the treatment on semi-durable consumptive 
expenditure as well as on the incidence of making major durable purchases. It is clear that while 
there is no significant treatment effect on non-durables, expenditure on semi-durables comprising 
clothing and footwear shows a statistically significant (p<0.01) drop as a result of the political 
uncertainty (Column 3). The 14.8 yuan decrease represents a 36% reduction of the mean monthly 
expenditure on clothing and footwear. Column 4 shows that political uncertainty resulted in large 
decreases in spending on major durables: the probability of making a durable goods purchase 
decreased by 6.3%, accounting for almost 50% of durable goods purchases at mean level in 1989.  
 
Table 3 focuses on the treatment effect on total household income as well as on its two 
components, labor income and non-labor income. Looking across the first row, we can see that the 
point estimates are invariably small and statistically insignificant at any conventional level. We 
therefore conclude that there is no evidence of any effect of the treatment on total household 
income or on any of its components. In particular, the small and insignificant estimate on labor 
income suggests that household labor supply was not affected by the uncertainty shock. We also 
exploited the panel feature of our data to estimate idiosyncratic household income uncertainty by 
month. Interestingly, there is no evidence that political uncertainty shock in our context translates 
into household income uncertainty identified using realized income streams.22  
22 Following Meghir and Pisfaferri (2004), we first regress log of household income on year-month 
dummies, dummies for household size and a quadratic in the age of the head. We take the predicted residual 
log income from this regression (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡) and identify the variance of permanent shocks in year-month t by 
𝐸𝐸(∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1)) where  ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is change in predicted residual between year-month t and year-
month t-1. The variance of transitory shocks (assuming i.i.d for simplicity) in year-month t is identified 
by −𝐸𝐸(∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1).  The variances of permanent shocks in April and May of 1989 are 0.010(0.012) and 
0.002(0.005), respectively (block-bootstrapped standard errors in brackets).  The variances of transitory 
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Since consumption is adjusted downwards whereas income is not affected, we would expect 
additional savings due to the uncertainty shock. Turning to the effect of the treatment on saving 
rates in Table 4, we find that, for savings defined by either the household budget constraint or the 
household balance sheet, the uncertainty shock results in around 18 percentage point increases in 
saving rates. The increases are significant at the 5% levels. The stock market volatility from May 
through to the beginning of June is six times greater than the market volatility in April. 
Consequently, one standard deviation increase in the variability of stock market prices leads to a 3 
percentage point increase in household savings.  
 
5.2. Heterogeneity in household responses 
The availability of microeconomic consumption data allows us to disentangle the heterogeneity of 
estimated effects by household characteristics defined before the uncertainty shock. In Table 5, we 
estimate our empirical model on log non-durable consumption, the incidence of making significant 
major durable purchases, and log total income and saving rates by age of head of household, by 
occupation of head of household, and by a proxy of wealth in the period before the uncertainty 
shock.  
 
The sample is neatly split into two equally-sized halves using a cut-off age of 45 for the head of 
household. It emerges that the treatment effect on older families is far more pronounced, with a 24 
percentage point increase in saving rates and an 11 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
major durable expenditure, both of which are also significant at the 1% level. While still positive, 
the effects on major durable purchases and savings for families headed by individuals aged below 
45 are smaller in size and statistically insignificant. Younger households may have steeper 
expected income growth over the life cycle (due to the on-going economic reform) than the elder 
households have had.  Furthermore, for urban households, pension was generously provided by the 
state (Chamon et. al. 2013). The political uncertainty would also lead to uncertainty over the 
pension. All these factors may induce the elder household to respond more dramatically to the 
uncertainty shock.   
 
Our definition of white-collar occupations includes all professionals and technicians, senior and 
junior government officials, corporate managers and office clerks. Overall, they account for 47% 
shocks in April and May of 1989 are 0.026(0.006) and 0.018(0.006), respectively.  Neither difference in 
permanent shocks nor transitory shocks is significant at conventional level.  
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of the occupations of the heads of households in our sample. Blue-collar refers to all remaining 
occupations. In the period of study, most of the enterprises are state-owned whose managers must 
be appointed or approved by the state. Government officials are also appointed and not elected by 
the public. Therefore, one would expect that the uncertainty from the pro-democracy political 
movement is greater for white-collar households. Indeed, we find larger impact on consumption 
and savings for white-collar households. For white-collar households, Table 5 shows that the 
treatment leads to a 30 percentage point increase in saving rates and a 9 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of major durable consumption, both with significance at the 5% level. For blue-
collar households, the effect is less compared to their white-collar counterparts and not 
significantly different from zero, even at the 10% level.  
 
We also disaggregate the sample by the amount of financial wealth prior to the uncertainty shock. 
Looking at the treatment effect by wealth, we can see that the positive effect is driven by wealthier 
households with pre-period wealth above the median. The mean effects are a 25 percentage point 
increase in saving rates and a 6 percentage point decrease in the probability of major durable 
expenditure, with statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. By contrast, the 
treatment turns out to be more dampened and statistically insignificant for the poorer half of 
households. Wealthy households also have a higher spending on durables and semi-durables, both 
on the extensive and the intensive margin.  Given that the main channel of adjustment is through 
reductions in durable and semi-durable expenditures, it is not surprising that the saving rate among 
the wealthy also increases the most. 
 
To sum up, Table 5 suggests that the treatment effect on major durable purchases and saving rates 
is largely driven by older, wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. Moreover, in 
accordance with our main results based on the full sample, we find no evidence of any effect of the 
treatment on non-durable consumption and income in any of the subsamples. 
 
5.3. Dynamic effect 
In this section, we estimate our empirical model for six key outcome variables, only this time using 
June, July or August instead of May as the treatment group. The idea is to shed some light on the 
dynamics of the uncertainty shock beyond the initial impact. Following Dengʼs June 9 speech on 
the restoration of order, the extent of policy uncertainty may have gradually faded away. The new 
political leadership seized control of the economy with the ideology that central planning should be 
the focus, and the market should take on a subordinate role. 
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With declining policy uncertainty, households should begin to draw on the extra precautionary 
savings made under the riskier environment and revert to a higher level of consumption. The new 
steady-state level of consumption could still be lower than the initial steady-state of consumption if 
policy uncertainty remained permanently higher than previously. Table 6 shows that the magnitude 
of the decline in consumption (and the increase in saving rate) was much smaller in June compared 
to the changes in May. While the effects of the treatment on all types of consumption are negative, 
they are now much smaller. In the case of semi-durables, major durable purchases and savings, the 
sizes of the treatment effect are roughly halved and become statistically insignificant. Moving into 
July and August, the overall pattern is that the negative consumption adjustment in response to the 
uncertainty shock is much smaller (with the exception of semi-durables).   
 
This exercise above highlights the importance of having high-frequency data in order to capture 
the effect of a large but short-lived shock to uncertainty, as in our case. Aggregated data at annual 
or quarterly frequencies would average out the initial consumption adjustment with subsequent 
adjustments.  When there is an unanticipated increase in uncertainty (regardless of whether the 
increase in uncertainty is persistent or temporary), the buffer-stock model of precautionary savings 
will predict a sharpest jump in saving rate (and a sharpest drop in consumption) happening 
immediately after the uncertainty shock took place (e.g. Carroll (1992), Chamon, Liu, Prasad 
(2013)).  Consistent with this prediction, we find that the magnitude of the decline in consumption 
(and the increase in the saving rate) is the largest in May 1989 when the uncertainty shock took 
place. For instance, relative to April 1989, the increases in saving rate are about 18 percentage 
points in May 1989 (Table 4) and between 9 to 13 percentage points from June 1989 to August 
1989.  
 
5.4 Robustness checks and measurement issues 
We subject our previous estimates to a range of robustness checks. Table 7A presents further 
evidence of effect on the incidence of major durable adjustment with respect to different cut-offs, 
measured either as a share of total household income or as absolute values. Reduction of durable 
goods expenditures is driven by postponement of purchases of relatively large items of major 
durables--there is significant reduction in durable goods spending at the extensive margin, for large 
durables with total values of more than 100 yuan, or those accounting for more than 30% of total 
household income. 
17 
 
 
In Table 7B, we present three additional checks.  First, in equation (1), we include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the year of observation falls in 1991 and estimate it using data from April 
and May of 1989, 1990, and 1991. By doing so, the seasonality of our outcome variables between 
April and May is identified by changes between consumption in April and May in years 1990 and 
1991. The point estimates remain similar when we use both 1990 and 1991 as the control group. 
Second, we compare outcomes in June-Dec to outcomes in Jan-Mar in 1989, controlling for 
seasonality with the help of years 1990 and 1991. To the extent that pessimism is concerned with 
longer term prospects than those arising from short-term uncertainties, this placebo test would 
enable us to separate the effect of uncertainty from more general pessimism about the future. The 
results indicate that there is no statistically significant effect when we compare June-Dec to Jan-
Mar in 1989, suggesting that the effect is concentrated in April and May in 1989 and hence is more 
likely due to changes in political uncertainty rather than pessimism per se. Third, we conduct 
additional placebo test by using the same months (April and May as in our main specification) in 
years after the political event and calling one year as treatment and the other as control. We do not 
find any significant differences in any of the outcome variables.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the monthly UHS expenditure data utilized in this paper is based on 
detailed daily diary entries covering all types of household expenditures. By contrast, most 
expenditure data from OECD countries are based on diaries for a short period (one or two weeks) 
and suffer from high non-response. In addition, UHS survey officials report very high response 
rates due to the extensive supervision by the local household survey divisions and a comprehensive 
set of instructions for Survey officials.23 For these reasons, in comparison with other consumption 
panel data, the quality of the monthly UHS data should be relatively high. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to understand the implication of measurement error in the outcome variable such as consumption 
on our parameter of interest (the effect of the political event).  For illustrative purpose, suppose the 
true regression model is: ci = βzi + ϵi 
where ci is the true consumption, zi is an independent variable which is measured without error 
(the political event).  Suppose that, instead of ci, in the data we observe ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖 which is equal to the 
23 For instance, survey officials were instructed to assist the selected households with homework and 
childcare and otherwise comply with the households' customs. They also revisited selected households who 
initially refuse to participate in order to convince them about the importance of their participation (Bjerkholt 
and Zhu (1993)). 
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sum of the unobserved true consumption and a measurement error term ωi that is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the error term ϵi.  Then,  
?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖 = βzi + vi 
where  
  vi  = ϵi − ωi 
The new error term includes both a component for measurement error on the right-hand side and a 
component for the original error in the regression. Therefore, when consumption is mismeasured, 
the error term on the right-hand side has increased variance.  The estimated effect of the political 
event remains unbiased, but the estimates will tend to have larger standard errors.   
 
5.5. Alternative interpretations 
We recognize that there may be alternative explanations (other than uncertainty channel) which 
may drive our empirical findings. One interpretation of our results could be that the drop in 
household consumption also reflects a slow-down in growth or an expectation of a slow-down, 
give that China faced broad international sanctions following the Tiananmen Square crackdown.  
Our empirical specification is limited in distinguishing the slow-down in the mean growth from the 
uncertainty effect. However, our previous estimates suggest that neither total household income 
nor major components of household income is much affected by the political event (Table 3). In 
addition, although one might argue that the Western economic sanctions against China following 
the Tiananmen crackdown have affected China's export, GDP and consumers' expectations of 
growth, the first package of sanctions from the US was not passed by the US congress until June 
29, 1989. The "pessimism" hypothesis might explain why we found some effect for July and 
August 1989, but it is much less convincing to explain the consumption patterns in May and June.   
 
Another interpretation could be that a political shock like the Tian'anmen incident might have an 
immediate effect on economic activities, which gives people strong motives to stay at home (e.g. 
because of fear) and postpone consumption until the society has recovered its normal state. If 
"disruption" is the main channel, we would expect close to zero spending on durable purchases for 
most households rather than just cutting back.  On the contrary, our estimates above suggest that 
households are mostly cutting back large durable purchases rather than not spending at all. The 
richness of the data in consumption and income also allows us to investigate this potential 
alternative interpretation by conducting our analysis on three additional sets of outcomes.   
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Appendix Table A1 reports the effects of the political uncertainty on expenditures on energy 
(separately for water, electricity, gas, fuels) and transportation.  If people stayed at home in event 
of a highly tensed period, we would expect water and energy consumption to increase (especially 
for electricity) and the expenditure on transportation to decrease.  However, across different types 
of energy consumption, water and transportation expenditure, we find no significant effect of the 
political uncertainty. There appears to be little evidence that individuals stayed more at home 
during the period of political event.24 As our second set of evidence, we estimate impact of the 
political uncertainty on food expenditures from catering (i.e. restaurants and takeaways).  
Appendix Table A2 shows that none of these types of expenditure is affected by the political event, 
providing additional support that economic activity (e.g. going out for food) did not slow down 
during this period. Appendix Tables A3a-A3c shows that there is no evidence of a change in 
household labor income across various types of employment and various components of labor 
income. In particular, certain income components such as self-employment income and bonus are 
good indicators of economic activities. Among income categories from self-employment, floating 
wages or bonuses, we don't see any effect of the political event. 
 
Taken together, results from our additional analysis do not suggest that there was reduced 
economic activity during the period of political uncertainty.  Therefore, the more plausible channel 
for households to postpone consumption into the future is through an increase in uncertainty and 
the need to build a larger buffer stock savings against future uncertainty. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We present evidence that a surge in political uncertainty resulted in significant temporary increases 
in savings among urban households in China. Our study exploits a large-scale unanticipated and 
rapidly evolving political event that took place in Beijing in 1989. Our estimates also suggest the 
channel through which increase in savings is achieved: the increase in savings is driven by 
reductions in semi-durable and frequency of major durable adjustment. The uncertainty effect is 
more pronounced among older, wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. We interpret 
our findings using existing models of precautionary behavior. By focusing on time variation in 
24 We should also emphasize that Sichuan province (where the households are sampled) is far away from 
the epicenter of the event (Beijing), and any disruption to public order in the capital of Sichuan was short-
lived (see Section 3.1). 
                                                 
20 
 
uncertainty, our identification strategy avoids many of the potential problems in empirical studies 
of precautionary savings such as self-selection and life-cycle effects. Our findings on the channel 
of adjustment also coincide with the predictions from models on durable good adjustment 
combined with income uncertainty. Our findings suggests that political uncertainties are costly: in 
the Chinese case, households saved more and consumed less due to political uncertainty, even 
when the increase in uncertainty was temporary in nature. In situations of prolonged political 
turmoil, the impact on household consumption is likely to be greater.  
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Figure 1: Annual GDP Growth 
 
 
Source: OECD Statistics. 
 
Figure 2: Newspaper Frequency Index 
 
 
Source: New York Times Archive (accessed through ProQuest), Financial Times, and Economist 
Archive (accessed through Gale News Vault). The frequency index counts the number of articles 
containing the following word combinations: China AND (uncertainty OR uncertain). The index in 
May includes articles appearing from May 1, 1989 up to June 10, 1989.  
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Figure 3: The Hang Seng Index, April 1–June 30, 1989 
 
Note: The daily Hang Seng Index of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, from April to June of 1989.  
The standard deviation of daily closing price from May 1 to June 12 (including the first trading day 
after Deng's speech) is 382. The standard deviations of daily closing price in April and between 
June 13 and 30 are 53.95 and 54.02, respectively.  
Key trading days and the corresponding political events are marked on the graph in abbreviated 
form and are explained below:  
5/22/1989: Martial law declared in Beijing.  
5/23/1989: Over a million workers and citizens were able to halt a military crackdown on pro-
democracy movement in Beijing the day before.  
5/25/1989: Many conflicting developments in Beijing regarding the student democracy movement.  
6/5/1989: June 4 army crackdown on student demonstrations in Tian’anmen Square.  
6/12/1989: On June 9, Party leader Deng Xiaoping made his first public appearance in months, 
signaling the restoration of order.  
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Figure 4: Mean Monthly Consumption and Income, 1989–1990 
 
 
 
Note: Aggregate time series of monthly consumption and income in 1989 and 1990. Authors’ own 
calculation using a four-year rotational monthly panel of 270 households in Sichuan province for 
the time period 1989–1990. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics, by year 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 
Total household income 313.8 307.5 323.4 367.3 328.0 
 Labor income 228.6 217.0 227.1 260.1 233.2 
 Non-labor income 85.2 90.5 96.3 107.2 94.8 
Total household consumptive expenditure 
 [proportion positive values] 
304.8 
[1.000] 
272.6 
[1.000] 
287.6 
[1.000] 
319.5 
[1.000] 
296.1 
[1.000] 
 Non-durables 
 [proportion positive values] 
208.5 
[1.000] 
202.5 
[1.000] 
213.0 
[1.000] 
245.5 
[1.000] 
217.4 
[1.000] 
 Semi-durables (clothing & footwear) expenditure 
 [proportion positive values] 
44.3 
[0.851] 
35.5 
[0.816] 
38.5 
[0.839] 
45.4 
[0.853] 
40.9 
[0.840] 
 Major durables expenditure 
 [proportion positive values] 
52.0 
[0.164] 
34.6 
[0.120] 
36.21 
[0.135] 
28.9 
[0.122] 
37.8 
[0.135] 
Household size 3.313 3.256 3.192 3.234 3.249 
Saving rate 0.029 0.113 0.111 0.130 0.096 
Saving rate defined by household balance sheet -0.038 0.059 0.047 0.066 0.033 
Saving rate from the full UHS data a 0.056 0.111 0.153 0.138 - 
 
Notes: The data used in this paper consist of a four-year rotational monthly panel of 270 households in Sichuan 
province for the time period 1988–1991. Due to the rotational panel design, each household is observed for 12, 
24 or 36 months. All monetary figures are monthly in January 1988 constant prices.  
Non-durables include food, medicine and medical supplies, housing and building materials, health and medical 
services, and education (school fees). 
Semi-durables include clothing and footwear. 
Major durables comprise furniture, mechanical and electric goods for cultural and recreational activities, and 
mechanical and electric goods for daily use. 
a: Urban household saving rates derived from the UHS data for six provinces and municipalities including 
Sichuan (Yang et al. 2011, p. 45). 
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Table 2: Real total household expenditure and non-durable expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Consumptive 
expenditure 
Non-durable 
consumption 
Semi-durable 
consumption 
Purchase 
major durable 
(>25% HH 
income) 
May*1989 -45.543* 1.041 -14.793*** -0.063** 
 (25.869) (10.056) (5.192) (0.028) 
Year=1989 5.630 -10.003 11.770*** 0.011 
 (18.312) (7.118) (3.675) (0.019) 
Month=May 29.617 -11.208 10.744*** 0.048** 
 (18.309) (7.117) (3.675) (0.019) 
Household size 63.146*** 34.011*** 9.444*** 0.022*** 
 (6.941) (2.698) (1.393) (0.007) 
Female head 1.188 6.079 2.125 -0.015 
 (13.727) (5.336) (2.755) (0.015) 
Head's age 7.601** 5.171*** 1.840** 0.004 
 (3.662) (1.423) (0.735) (0.004) 
Head's age squared -0.060 -0.041*** -0.019** -0.000 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) 
Constant -164.726** -54.861* -42.374*** -0.118 
 (81.034) (31.499) (16.265) (0.086) 
R2 0.093 0.172 0.072 0.022 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, 
which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Real total household income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Monthly HH 
income 
Real monthly HH 
labor income 
Real monthly HH 
non-labor income 
May*1989 4.637 9.157 -4.521 
 (13.084) (12.400) (8.826) 
Year=1989 -20.646** -16.304* -4.342 
 (9.261) (8.778) (6.248) 
Month=May -6.991 -6.924 -0.067 
 (9.260) (8.776) (6.247) 
Household size 58.907*** 40.723*** 18.184*** 
 (3.511) (3.327) (2.368) 
Female head 14.497** -11.186* 25.682*** 
 (6.943) (6.580) (4.684) 
Head's age 10.141*** 18.881*** -8.740*** 
 (1.852) (1.755) (1.249) 
Head's age squared -0.095*** -0.229*** 0.134*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) 
Constant -145.771*** -267.227*** 121.455*** 
 (40.984) (38.843) (27.648) 
R2 0.269 0.347 0.285 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, 
which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4: Saving rates 
 (1) (2) 
 Saving rate Saving rate defined by 
HH balance sheet 
May*1989 0.185** 0.180** 
 (0.077) (0.078) 
Year=1989 -0.108** -0.100* 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
Month=May -0.100* -0.100* 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
Household size -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Female head 0.040 0.046 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Head’sHH age 0.003 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Head’s age squared -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.109 0.088 
 (0.242) (0.244) 
R2 0.007 0.007 
Observations 1078 1078 
 
Note: Saving rate is defined as the ratio of savings to income; saving rate2 is the ratio of changes in financial wealth to 
income. Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after group dummy, and the full set of control variables 
which include household size, female head of household, as well as a quadratic in the age of the head of household. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity by household characteristics 
Treatment effect (May×1989) Log non-
durable 
consumption 
Purchase 
major 
durable 
(>25% HH 
income) 
Log total 
income 
Saving rate 
By age of the head of household:     
 Head of household aged over 45  0.012 -0.113*** -0.020 0.239*** 
 (0.069) (0.039) (0.068) (0.089) 
 Head of household aged 45 or below 0.011 -0.014 0.055 0.133 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.059) (0.125) 
     
By occupation of the head of household:     
 Head of household white-collar worker  0.017 -0.089** 0.007 0.298** 
  (0.067) (0.040) (0.057) (0.124) 
 Head of household blue-collar worker 0.009 -0.041 0.028 0.081 
 (0.064) (0.038) (0.067) (0.096) 
     
By pre-treatment wealth:     
 High wealth (median or above) 0.037 -0.064* 0.049 0.251*** 
 (0.062) (0.036) (0.060) (0.093) 
 Low wealth (below median) 0.001 -0.048 -0.033 0.051 
 (0.072) (0.041) (0.064) (0.118) 
 
Note: White-collar occupations include all professionals and technicians, senior and junior government officials, 
corporate managers and office clerks. Blue-collar refers to all remaining occupations. Regressions control for a 
treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, which include household size, 
female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 6: Effects of uncertainty shock over time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Consump-
tive 
expenditure 
Non-durable 
consump-
tion 
Semi-
durable 
consump-
tion 
Purchase 
major 
durable 
(>25% HH 
income) 
Monthly 
HH income 
Saving rate 
June vs Apr 1989 
treatment -17.763 -8.214 -7.689 -0.037 1.902 0.087 
 (21.159) (10.675) (5.009) (0.028) (13.110) (0.072) 
       
July vs Apr 1989 
treatment -27.406 -8.168 -14.454*** -0.033 1.344 0.128** 
 (20.561) (10.762) (4.392) (0.028) (13.994) (0.064) 
       
August vs Apr 1989 
treatment -35.994 -6.106 -12.011*** -0.011 -7.242 0.109 
 (22.704) (12.688) (4.051) (0.027) (13.264) (0.069) 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control 
variables, which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of 
household. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7A: Robustness: Major durable expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Durable 
spending >10% 
HH income 
Durable 
spending >30% 
HH income 
Durable 
spending >50% 
HH income 
Durable 
spending 
>100RMB 
Treatment (May*1989)  -0.052 -0.063** -0.044** -0.052** 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, 
which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 7B: Robustness: Alternative specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Consumptive 
expenditure 
Non-durable 
consumption 
Semi-durable 
consumption 
Purchase major durable 
(>25% HH income) 
Monthly 
HH 
income 
Saving 
rate 
 
Using years 1990 and 1991 to control for seasonality 
Treatment  -32.075 -0.410 -11.811** -0.052** 2.698 0.138** 
 
(21.827) (10.024) (4.808) (0.024) (12.397) (0.063) 
N 1618 1618 1618 1618 1618 1618 
 
Placebo test: Treatment: 1989, Control: 1990-1991, Before: Jan-Mar, After: June-Dec 
Treatment  -20.737 -3.953 -2.545 -0.001 -5.824 0.033 
 
(13.047) (6.731) (2.985) (0.012) (8.367) (0.031) 
N 8090 8090 8090 8090 8090 8090 
 
Placebo test: Treatment: 1990, Control: 1991, Before: April, After: May 
Treatment  27.011 -2.850 5.932 0.023 -3.854 -0.094 
 
(26.511) (12.261) (5.546) (0.028) (15.097) (0.067) 
N 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, 
which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Effects of the political uncertainty on real expenditure on water, energy and transportation 
 water electricity gas fuel urban 
transport 
other 
transport 
May*1989 -0.113 -0.070 0.161 0.362 0.232 -0.700 
 (0.136) (0.449) (0.314) (0.378) (0.302) (0.713) 
R2 0.022 0.026 0.082 0.023 0.016 0.006 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
 
Table A2: Effects of the political uncertainty on real expenditure on food from catering trade, cigarettes, tobacco, 
alcohol and tea 
 staple food 
from 
catering 
Non-staple 
food from 
catering 
May*1989 -0.035 -1.311 
 (0.578) (2.215) 
R2 0.009 0.006 
Observations 1078 1078 
 
 
Table A3a: Effects of the political uncertainty on labor income, by ownership of employers 
 state-owned 
enterprises 
collectively- 
owned 
enterprises  
other income 
from work 
units 
net profits of 
self-employed 
wage income 
from self- 
employment 
May*1989 5.723 2.199 0.215 -0.179 -0.147 
 (12.918) (6.551) (3.122) (1.159) (0.714) 
R2 0.258 0.075 0.074 0.033 0.009 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
 
Table A3b: Effects of the political uncertainty on labor income from State-Owned Enterprises 
 base wage floating wage contract wage bonuses subsidies 
May*1989 1.479 - - 3.139 -0.695 
 (7.749)   (5.616) (2.698) 
R2 0.307 . . 0.063 0.117 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
 
Table A3c: Effects of the political uncertainty on labor income from Collectively-Owned Enterprises 
 base wage floating wage contract wage bonuses subsidies 
May*1989 0.163 0.772 0.100 1.382 -0.040 
 (3.873) (2.629) (0.919) (2.456) (0.815) 
R2 0.069 0.013 0.007 0.027 0.030 
Observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 1078 
 
Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, 
which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Floating wage and contract wage were only implemented in 
State-Owned Enterprises in later years. 
 
   
 
 
